

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 056034

EXDIS - MILITARY TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING USNATO 1419 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALL NATO  
CAPITALS MOSCOW MARCH 13; REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 1419

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF AND USNMR SHAPE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS), NATO, PFOR, NAC

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO NATO: DRAFT OBJECT-  
IVES AND ISSUES PAPER

BEGIN SUMMARY OF DRAFT OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES PAPER FOR THE  
SECRETARY'S VISIT TO NATO TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS FOR YOUR VISIT  
TO NATO, WE DESCRIBE IN THIS PAPER THE MOOD OF THE ALLIES  
AND THEMES AND ISSUES YOU SHOULD COVER IN YOUR MEETING WITH  
THE COUNCIL.  
END SUMMARY.

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INTRODUCTION: YOUR VISIT TO NATO PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY  
TO DEMONSTRATE TO ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, THEIR GOVERNMENTS,  
AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN MEDIA THE ADMINISTRATION'S CON-  
TINUING COMMITMENT TO CONSULTATIONS ON ISSUES CENTRAL TO  
EAST-WEST RELATIONS. YOU WILL FIND THE ALLIES IN A  
QUESTIONING MOOD, EAGER TO LEARN ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF  
YOUR PROSPECTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS AND

ANXIOUS, ABOVE ALL, TO BE REASSURED ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S SENSITIVITY TO ALLIED CONCERNS. ADMINISTRATION'S INITIATIVES IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FIELD HAVE LEFT WESTERN EUROPE SOMEWHAT BREATHLESS AND OFF BALANCE. OUR ALLIES ARE UNCERTAIN AS YET ABOUT THE SCOPE OF US OBJECTIVES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE DETAILS OF US PLANS FOR WORKING TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES. THUS, YOU CAN PROVIDE FURTHER ASSURANCES OF INTENT TO CONSULT, AS US PLANS ARE DEVELOPED, IN LINE WITH VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE'S JANUARY PLEDGE TO THE COUNCIL. SPECIFICALLY, WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD DESCRIBE IN SOME DETAIL THE GENERAL US APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OUTLINE THE PROGRAM FOR DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, AND COVER A RANGE OF QUESTIONS ON SALT, ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OTHER ISSUES LISTED BELOW. THE MESSAGE WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LEAVE WITH THE ALLIES IS THAT WE SEE THEM AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN OUR COMMON ENDEAVORS TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC AND OTHER WEAPONS, TO FOSTER DETENTE, AND TO STRENGTHEN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. END INTRODUCTION.

1. THE ALLIES WILL WARMLY WELCOME YOUR VISIT TO NATO HEADQUARTERS AND WILL APPRECIATE YOUR READINESS TO REVIEW WITH THEM THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS--BEFORE YOU PROCEED TO MOSCOW. FOR THE SMALLER ALLIES, YOUR VISIT TO NATO HEADQUARTERS WILL BE ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT, SINCE IT WILL PROVIDE A SENSE OF DIRECT CONTACT, THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HERE, WITH THE NEW AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE. YOUR CONFIDENTIAL

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MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL, TWO MONTHS AFTER PRESIDENT CARTER'S INAUGURATION, WILL ALSO SIGNIFY THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE EAST AND EFFORTS TO LIMIT AND REDUCE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION. IT WILL FURTHER SYMBOLIZE OUR ATTACHMENT TO THE ALLIANCE SO DRAMATICALLY UNDERLINED BY VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL ON JANUARY 24.

2. YOUR VISIT TO NATO COMES AT A TIME WHEN OUR WESTERN ALLIES ARE IMPRESSED, INTRIGUED, AND EVEN ASTONISHED, BY THE VIGOR THE PRESIDENT HAS SHOWN IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ALLIED OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN STRUCK PARTICULARLY BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S FORCEFULNESS AND SPEED IN:

--TACKLING FESTERING REGIONAL PROBLEMS--  
THE TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS TRIANGLE, THE

MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES,  
ALL OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE ALLIANCE,  
AS WELL AS CHALLENGES FURTHER AFIELD SUCH  
AS PANAMA AND VIETNAM.  
--SEEKING THROUGH THE DIRECT,  
PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED PROPOSALS OF THE PRESIDENT  
TO MOVE WITH DISPATCH TO AGREEMENT WITH  
THE SOVIET SOON A SERIES OF ARMS CONTROL  
MEASURES RELEVANT TO ALLIED SECURITY.  
--SUCCEEDING, AS IT SEEMS AT PRESENT, IN  
CHANGING THE GROUND RULES OF EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS BY EMBRACING IDEOLOGIC COMPETITION  
IN  
IN A WAY THAT HAS DRAMATIZED THE APPEAL  
OF LIBERAL WESTERN SOCIETY AND HAS PLACED  
THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSIVE.

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3. THERE IS MUCH IN ALL OF THIS THAT IS NEW TO THE ALLIES--  
NOT ONLY THE PERSONALITIES, STYLE AND TONE, BUT ALSO THE  
AFFIRMATION THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE A SALIENT A FEATURE  
OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. THE ALLIES ARE DELIGHTED, AND  
EVEN EXHILARATED, WITH THE LEADERSHIP THE NEW  
ADMINISTRATION HAS DEMONSTRATED. BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET  
ASSIMILATED THE IMPORT OF OUR POLICIES NOR REACHED FIRM  
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THEIR LONG-RANGE IMPACT ON EAST-  
WEST RELATIONS, THE PROCESS OF DETENTE, AND TRANS-  
ATLANTIC RELATIONS. THE ALLIES ARE IN A QUESTIONING  
MOOD, AND THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR REASSURANCES REGARDING  
THE FOLLOWING CENTRAL CONCERNS:  
--THAT THE CALCULATED SOVIET REACTION TO  
THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS  
MAY YET BE BRUTAL OR THAT  
EFFERVESCENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE  
MAY PROMPT A CLUMSY SOVIET CRACKDOWN; THAT SUCH REACTIONS  
MAY SET VACK DETENTE, COMPLICATE THE BILATERAL  
RELATIONS OF OUR ALLIES WITH EASTERN EUROPE,  
AND POSE DILEMMAS IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICS  
OF WESTERN COUNTRIES.  
--THAT THE PRESIDENT'S THRUST, THROUGH DICT  
CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, FOR RAPID CONCLUSION  
OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT IMPINGE ON THE  
SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE DEFENSE PLANS  
OF SOME ALLIES, POINTS TOWARD A US-SOVIET  
AGENDA TO BE CARRIED FORWARD ON AN AD HOC  
BASIS WITHOUT COLLECTIVE ANALYSIS OR  
CONSULTATION AMONG THE NATO ALLIES.  
--THAT THE VIGOR AND IMAGINATION OF THE  
NEW ADMINISTRATION, BOLSTERED BY LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY AND BY

ECONOMIC STRENGTH BETTER ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE CURRENT EXIGENCIES  
THAN THAT OF MOST ALLIES, FORESHADOW  
A PERIOD IN WHICH THE US WILL BE, OVER-  
WHELMINGLY, THE PRINCIPAL PROTAGONIST  
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS; THAT THE US  
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WILL BE SETTING THE RULES AND TAKING  
THE INITIATIVES, WHILE THE ALLIES ATTEMPT TO ADJUST,  
ADAPT, AND UNDERSTAND WHAT WE ARE ABOUT;  
IN BRIEF, THAT THE ALLIES MAY BE ADJUNCTS  
TO THE ACTIVITIES WE HAVE LAUNCHED,  
RATHER THAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

4. WE HAVE DONE MUCH ALREADY TO ALLEVIATE ALLIED CONCERNS  
THROUGH THE PROGRAM OF CONSULTATIONS CARRIED FORWARD  
UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE'S  
VISIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S MARCH 11 BRIEFING  
ON YOUR TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, A FULL REPORT ON  
AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S TRIP TO AFRICA, BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS  
WITH MAJOR ALLIES, TOGETHER WITH YOUR VISIT AND THE  
BRIEFINGS PLANNED FOLLOWING YOUR  
TRIP TO MOSCOW--THESE STEPS HAVE PROVIDED IMPORTANT  
ASSURANCES TO THE ALLIES OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT  
AND TO CONSIDER THEIR VIEWS.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE ALLIES  
WILL WISH TO HEAR, TO THE DEGREE YOU CAN COVER SUCH MATTERS  
IN YOUR OPENING STATEMENT AND IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUESTIONS,  
A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S THINKING AND EXPECTATIONS  
REGARDING THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

--SALT:

- A) WHAT HAS THE NEW ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED  
TO THE SOVIETS ALREADY AND HOW HAVE THE SOVIETS RESPONDED?
  - B) WHAT WILL THE US PROPOSE IN MOSCOW?
  - C) WHERE DO WE STAND WITH THE SOVIETS ON CRUISE MISSILES AND  
BACKFIRE? DID THE US PROPOSE EXCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES FROM  
SALT II IN ORDER TO PRESERVE DEPLOYMENT OR TO SIMPLIFY SALT II,  
OR BOTH?
  - D) THE ADMINISTRATION'S RECOGNITION OF ALLIED INTEREST  
IN NON-TRANSFER AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS  
AND FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS.
  - E) US VIEWS ON THE SS-20, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
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FOR THE "EUROSTRATEGIC" THREAT.

-- OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES:

A) MBFR: ARE THERE ANY NEW SIGNALS FROM THE SOVIETS AS TO THEIR EXPECTATIONS AND OBJECTIVES? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT FOR THE SOVIETS SALT II IS A PREREQUISITE TO PROGRESS IN MBFR?

B) CTB: IN LIGHT OF SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MUST BE PARTIES, WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVES OF HALTING FIRST US AND SOVIET TESTING AND FOR MODIFYING THE PRESENT SOVIET POSTURE?

C) US PROPOSALS AND STUDIES, REGARDING THE INDIAN OCEAN, SATELLITES, MISSILE LAUNCHES, NAVAL LIMITATIONS, AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS: WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR BILATERAL US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE ISSUES? HOW HAVE THE SOVIETS REACTED TO THE PROPOSALS ALREADY PUT TO THEM? WILL ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND HOW MIGHT THE ALLIES MOST USEFULLY PROVIDE THEIR VIEWS?

-- OTHER ISSUES:

A) CSCE: AN AFFIRMATION OF OUR INTENTION TO MAINTAIN THE EMPHASIS ON IMPLEMENTATION AT BELGRADE.

B) HUMAN RIGHTS: ARE THERE NOT INHERENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE DANGERS FOR DETENTE, FOR HARDENING THE SOVIET LEADERS' POSITIONS ON RELATED ISSUES, AND FOR TRANQUILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE?

C) MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: IN WHAT VEIN WILL THE US DISCUSS THESE AREAS WITH THE SOVIETS?

D) ECONOMIC ISSUES: WILL EAST-  
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WEST TRADE MFN, OR CREDITS BE ON YOUR AGENDA FOR MOSCOW?

E) NATO SUMMIT: IF THE ISSUE IS STILL OPEN, ALLIES MAY ASK ABOUT A NATO SUMMIT IN LONDON. STRAUSS-KAHN UNQUOTE  
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## Message Attributes

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